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DIRECTED TAX HOLIDAYS: ECONOMIC 
STIMULUS OR CORPORATE DREAM? 
DAKOTA NEWTON? 
ABSTRACT 
U.S. corporations currently have more than $2.4 trillion 
stashed in the accounts of their overseas subsidiaries—a sum that 
costs the domestic economy billions of dollars every year. A directed 
tax holiday is one potential method of inducing repatriation of 
those funds and stimulating the domestic economy. Although a 
previous tax holiday failed to meet expectations, current proposals 
from the public and private sectors suggest that a directed tax 
holiday could fund much-needed infrastructure investment. A review 
and economic analysis of these proposals shows that a directed 
tax holiday that channels revenue into expanding and updating 
infrastructure will greatly benefit the domestic economy. 
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Class of 2015. The author would like to thank his long-suffering wife for 
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INTRODUCTION 
In April 2016, Oxfam America released a report revealing 
that the top fifty U.S. corporations are holding more than $1.4 
trillion in offshore cash.1 While the dollar figure was not particu-
larly surprising—U.S. corporations have held large sums of cash 
offshore for decades—the report also claimed that the U.S. gov-
ernment is missing out on $130 billion annually as a result of 
corporate offshoring practices.2 Just a month later, the German 
newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung released a 2.6 terabyte data leak 
comprising roughly 11.5 million documents regarding billions of 
dollars that Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca assisted 
clients to hide in tax havens.3 Since that time, intense main-
stream media focus has brought the public’s attention to the facts 
that economists and accountants have known for years—American 
corporations hoard cash offshore to avoid paying domestic taxes.4 
A Citizen’s for Tax Justice report from March 2016 pegged the 
total amount held offshore by U.S. corporations at $2.4 trillion,5 
a number equivalent to France’s 2015 GDP.6 
Just as the world economy would suffer if the French econ-
omy ceased to exist, so does the American domestic economy when 
corporations hoard funds offshore.7 Simply put, $2.4 trillion held 
offshore is a missed opportunity for domestic investment.8 There 
                                                                                                            
1 OXFAM AMERICA, BROKEN AT THE TOP: HOW AMERICA’S DYSFUNCTIONAL 
TAX SYSTEM COSTS BILLIONS IN CORPORATE TAX DODGING 1–2 (Apr. 14, 2016). 
2 Id. at 2. 
3 Frederik Obermaier et al., About the Panama Papers, SÜDDEUTSCHE 
ZEITUNG 1, 3 (2016), http://panamapapers.sueddeutsche.de/articles/56febff0a1 
bb8d3c3495adf4/. 
4 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES HOLD A RECORD $2.4 
TRILLION OFFSHORE 1 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://ctj.org/pdf/pre0316.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/GQU9-MXEC]. 
5 Id.; OXFAM AMERICA, supra note 1, at 8; Jeff Sommer, A Stranded $2 
Trillion Overseas Stash Gets Closer to Coming Home, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/your-money/strategies-corporate 
-cash-repatriation-bipartisan-consensuss.html?_r=0 (discussing potential domes-
tic revenue from a repatriation event). 
6 WORLD BANK, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2015 1 (Oct. 11, 2016), https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20161010225636/http://databank.worldbank.org/data/down 
load/GDP.pdf. 
7 See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 1, 4. 
8 See Sommer, supra note 5, at 2. 
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are numerous proposals for how to return these funds to the 
United States, all of which have benefits and flaws.9 In this Note, I 
examine the merits of a directed tax holiday10 as a repatriation 
method. I review past attempts at a tax holiday and analyze exist-
ing and recent tax holiday proposals. Using projected figures 
and historic returns on investment, I conclude that a directed 
tax holiday will stimulate the U.S. economy by creating new jobs, 
reviving crumbling infrastructure, and prompting investment in 
green technology. 
In Part I, I briefly review the U.S. corporate tax system for 
foreign earnings and explain why corporations have so much money 
stored overseas. In Part II, I review the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004 and discuss its shortcomings. In Part III, I discuss 
pending legislation in Congress, proposals from the 2016 Presi-
dential candidates, and proposals from industry analysts. In Part 
IV, I examine the projected positive externalities that a directed tax 
holiday will bring. In Part V, I examine and rebut some of the 
negative externalities associated with tax holidays. I conclude that a 
directed tax holiday would greatly benefit the U.S. economy. 
I. HOW DID $2.4 TRILLION END UP OVERSEAS? 
Before discussing how to bring $2.4 trillion back to the 
United States, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss how such a huge 
sum of money ended up overseas. 
American corporations pay a 35 percent effective rate on 
their earnings, the highest rate in the developed world.11 The 
United States employs a residence-based tax system, meaning 
that American corporations are taxed on all of their income, 
                                                                                                            
9 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 4. 
10 I make a somewhat artificial distinction in this Note between a “tax hol-
iday” and a “directed tax holiday.” I define a “directed tax holiday” as a tax 
holiday that requires certain corporate investments for repatriated funds and 
earmarks federal revenues for a designated purpose. A “tax holiday” is merely 
a time period during which participating entities pay a reduced tax rate. 
11 DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40178, 
TAX CUTS ON REPATRIATION EARNINGS AS ECONOMIC STIMULUS: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 2 (2011). U.S. corporations pay taxes on their overseas earnings to the 
governments of the various countries that they do business in. When U.S. corpo-
rations bring their overseas funds back to the U.S., they pay the statutory rate of 
35 percent minus a tax credit equal to the taxes paid to foreign governments. 
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regardless of where it is earned, but foreign corporations are 
only taxed on income earned in the United States.12 Accordingly, 
U.S. corporations that operate overseas through a foreign sub-
sidiary can avoid paying U.S. taxes indefinitely so long as the 
foreign subsidiary retains control over the earnings and rein-
vests those earnings abroad.13 The U.S. firm only pays taxes on 
its foreign earnings when the money is repatriated into the U.S. 
as an intra-firm dividend or other form of income.14 This system 
gives corporations significant incentives to keep their money 
abroad, preferably in a tax haven.15 
A. How Corporations Avoid Paying Taxes 
American corporations use a number of complex methods 
to avoid paying U.S. taxes on foreign earnings.16 The practice of 
keeping cash overseas to avoid the repatriation tax is known as 
“profit-shifting.”17 Earnings stripping is another common method 
used to escape U.S. tax liability.18 Rather than describing these 
in detail, I would like to highlight the important effects of these 
entirely legal, but ethically questionable, practices.19 Thus, while 
                                                                                                            
12 Id. at 1. 
13 Id. at 1–2. 
14 Id. at 2. 
15 Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory 
Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1665, 1716 (2015). 
16 For a primer on how this works at the company level, see Walter Hickey, 
Apple Avoids Paying $17 Million In Taxes Every Day Through A Ballsy But 
Genius Tax Avoidance Scheme, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2013, 4:16 PM), http: 
//www.businessinsider.com/how-apple-reduces-what-it-pays-in-taxes-2013-5 
[https:// perma.cc/D2HY-YGBS] (detailing Apple, Inc.’s complex organizational 
scheme to minimize tax liability). 
17 Rob Davies, U.S. corporations have $1.4tn hidden in tax havens, claims 
Oxfam report, GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world 
/2016/apr/14/us-corporations-14-trillion-hidden-tax-havens-oxfam [https://perma 
.cc/XMZ5-TAZJ]. 
18 John C. Hamlett, The Declining Allure of Being “American” and the Pro-
liferation of Corporate Tax Inversions: A Critical Analysis of Regulatory Efforts to 
Curtail the Inversion Trend, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 767, 775 n.78, 776 n.81 (2016). 
19 See Nelson D. Schwartz & Charles Duhigg, Apple’s Web of Tax Shelters 
Saved It Billions, Panel Finds, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2013), http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/05/21/business/apple-avoided-billions-in-taxes-congressional 
-panel-says.html?pagewanted=all. 
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U.S. corporations are accused of using accounting “gimmicks” to 
avoid paying U.S. taxes,20 and are certainly avoiding the spirit of 
the law of taxation, there is no law enforcement mechanism cur-
rently available to the Federal government.21 
B. Losses Associated with Offshoring Practices 
Offshoring practices, while legal, are harmful to the Ameri-
can economy in several ways.22 First, offshoring deprives the 
American economy of domestic investment, and, second, it de-
prives the Federal government of significant tax revenues.23 
Ernst & Young estimates that the U.S. economy benefitted 
from $165 billion worth of private capital investment in 2015.24 
Approximately 22 percent of that came from foreign sources, so 
U.S. firms invested nearly $128 billion in capital improvements 
in 2015.25 This figure is roughly consistent with previous years.26 
The $2.4 trillion held overseas by U.S. firms, therefore, repre-
sents almost nineteen years of domestic capital investment.27 
In addition to lost domestic investment opportunities, off-
shoring also significantly reduces Federal tax revenues.28 Tax 
policy activist group Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) estimated 
                                                                                                            
20 Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 14 (2013) (testimony 
of Apple Inc.). 
21 Id. at 10, 16. This fact becomes important later when balancing utilities 
for repatriation proposals. See generally Nigel Green, In defence of ‘Tax Ha-
vens’: offshore banking is not the same as dodgy dealing, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 
2016, 10:29 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/13/off 
shore-panama-papers-murky-investors [https://perma.cc/W5NL-SHBE] (discuss-
ing the legality of using offshore financial centers). 
22 See Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19, at 2. 
23 See Davies, supra note 17, at 2. 
24 ERNST & YOUNG LLP, 2016 US INVESTMENT MONITOR TRACKING MOBILE 
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS DURING 2015, at 17 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publica 
tion/vwLUAssets/ey-2016-us-investment-monitor/$FILE/ey-2016-us-investment 
-monitor.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQW2-H5LA]. 
25 Id. at 9. 
26 Id. at 23–25. 
27 Id. at 23. 
28 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 3. 
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that the $2.4 trillion held offshore is depriving the U.S. government 
of nearly $700 billion in tax revenue.29 Economist Kimberly 
Clausing believes that the CTJ estimate is conservative and puts 
the lost tax revenue figure closer to $800 billion.30 Importantly, 
Clausing also estimates that corporate offshoring practices cost 
the Federal government some $94 billion annually, a figure that 
will only continue to rise in coming years.31 
The losses associated with offshoring suggest that action 
of some sort is necessary. While a comprehensive reform of the 
U.S. tax system would be welcome, such action is unlikely to 
occur soon.32 Thus, smaller actions appear to be the most feasible 
path forward for the near future. This brings us to the question 
of whether a directed tax holiday is a meritorious option. 
II. THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004 
The idea of a tax holiday is nothing new. It has been dis-
cussed, studied, and even attempted in 2004 to disastrous effect.33 
A. The American Jobs Creation Act 
Back in 2003, following the dot com bubble and subsequent 
recession, U.S. corporations held an estimated $650 billion over-
seas.34 In the interest of bringing those funds back to the United 
                                                                                                            
29 Id. 
30 Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax 
Base in the United States and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 905, 923–24 (2016). 
31 Id. at 21. 
32 See generally MILLER & CHEVALIER CHARTERED, NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE 
COUNCIL, 2016 TAX POLICY FORECAST SURVEY (2016), https://www.miller 
chevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/2016-Tax-Policy-Forecast-Survey-Full 
-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/GF3U-8FK7] (discussing recent attempts at com-
prehensive reform and the likelihood of comprehensive reform in 2017 and 2018). 
33 Chuck Marr & Chye-Ching Huang, Repatriation Tax Holiday Would Lose 
Revenue And Is a Proven Policy Failure, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 
(June 19, 2014), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/6-19-14tax 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZX26-QRFQ]. 
34 Bob Bryan, US companies are ‘hoarding’ a record $2.5 trillion in cash 
overseas, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/us-companies-hoarding-25-trillion-of-cash-overseas-2016-9 [http://perma 
.cc/A33G-93UP]. 
2018] DIRECTED TAX HOLIDAYS 683 
States, Congress approved an amendment to I.R.C. § 965(f), which 
allowed a temporary, undirected tax holiday.35 The American 
Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) permitted, inter alia, a temporary tax 
holiday from October 22, 2004 to October 22, 2006 during which 
U.S. corporations paid an effective rate of 5.25 percent on repa-
triated cash.36 Participating corporations were required to have 
an approved reinvestment plan for repatriated funds before re-
ceiving the reduced rate.37 According to the AJCA, the reinvestment 
plan could not provide for executive compensation, but could be 
used in the United States “as a source for the funding of worker 
hiring and training, infrastructure, research and development, 
capital investments, or the financial stabilization of the corpora-
tion for the purposes of job retention or creation.”38 Notably, 
there was no incremental investment requirement obligating 
participating corporations to demonstrate that the amount spent 
under the reinvestment plan was greater than either the aver-
age amount spent in previous years or the amount budgeted 
before receiving the dividend.39 Essentially, the Federal gov-
ernment relied on corporations to act in the spirit of the law, 
knowing that there was no serious enforcement mechanism to 
prevent corporations from taking advantage of the vagueness of 
the law.40 The stated purpose of the AJCA was to provide eco-
nomic stimulus in the United States and create new jobs.41 
                                                                                                            
35 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422, 118 
Stat. 1418, 1514–19 (2004). Section 422 of the AJCA is officially titled the 
Homeland Investment Act (HIA), but as the existing literature rarely distin-
guishes between the AJCA and the HIA, I will continue that trend. Unlike 
the directed tax holiday that I discuss, revenues from the AJCA were not 
funneled directly into a single agency or Department budget. 
36 Id. The AJCA accomplished this by giving repatriating corporations a 
“deduction equal to 85 percent of the increase in foreign-source earnings 
repatriated.” MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 2. 
37 MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 5. 
38 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 422(a), 118 
Stat. 1418, 1516 (2004). 
39 M. Mendel Pinson, Effects of 2004 Int’l Tax Holiday, Recommendations 
Going Forward, 132 TAX NOTES 845, 852 (2011). 
40 See id. 
41 Id. 
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B. The Effect and Shortcomings of the AJCA 
The AJCA did not go according to plan.42 Congressional rep-
resentatives anticipated that repatriating corporations would bring 
$400 billion back into the domestic economy, creating more than 
600,000 jobs and reducing the deficit by $163 billion.43 Although the 
ACJA holiday generated some $16.4 billion in revenue for the U.S. 
Treasury,44 it did not create nearly as many jobs as anticipated.45 
Corporations brought back about $362 billion of the more 
than $600 billion held overseas; $312 billion of which qualified for 
5.25 percent rate.46 Unfortunately, most of the funds were not spent 
on new jobs.47 Participating corporations increased share buybacks 
by $60 billion more than non-participating firms—accounting for 
roughly 20 percent of the total amount repatriated.48 There is also 
no evidence that the AJCA created very many jobs.49 The Congres-
sional Research Service found that many of the largest participating 
                                                                                                            
42 Michelle Leder, The $104 Billion Refund: The most absurd corporate tax 
giveaway of 2005, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Apr. 13, 2006, 12:33 PM), http://www 
.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2006/04/the_104_billion_refund.html
[http://perma.cc/CB7D-UX3R]. 
43 This is according to House Ways and Means Committee member Phil 
English, R-Pa., who drafted the bill. See Roy Clemons & Michael R. Kinney, 
An Analysis of the Tax Holiday for Repatriation Under the Jobs Act, 52 TAX 
NOTES 759, 760 (2008). 
44 Matthew Jerome Mauntel, Stimulating the Stimulus: U.S. Controlled 
Subsidies and I.R.C. 965, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 107 (2010). There is 
some debate on the success of this point, as the amount repatriated would have 
generated $128 billion in tax revenue without the tax holiday. See also Pinson, 
supra note 39, at 853. However, there is no indication that U.S. firms had any 
intention of repatriating funds at the 35 percent rate, so it is difficult to ac-
cept the proposition that the Treasury lost money because of the holiday. Id. 
45 Michael Mundaca, Just the Facts: The Costs of a Repatriation Tax Holiday, 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY: TREASURY NOTES (Mar. 23, 2011), https://www 
.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Just-the-Facts-The-Costs-of-a-Repatriation-Tax 
-Holiday.aspx [http://perma.cc/Z2S2-SFR3]. 
46 Melissa Redmiles, The One-Time Received Dividend Deduction, 27 STAT. 
INCOME BULL. 102, 103 (2008). 
47 Floyd Norris, Tax Break for Profits Went Awry, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/business/05norris.html (“About 92 
percent of it went to shareholders ....”). 
48 Jennifer Blouin & Linda Krull, Bringing It Home: A Study of the Incen-
tives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings Under the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 1027, 1051 (2009). 
49 Mundaca, supra note 45; Leder, supra note 42. 
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companies actually cut jobs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006—even 
though the U.S. economy as a whole added jobs in those years.50 
Economist Martin Sullivan described the AJCA’s reinvest-
ment plan requirements as a “ridiculous fig leaf” that accomplished 
nothing: “If I’m going to give you $100 to buy lunch, ... but you 
spend $500 a year anyway on lunch, you then bring back receipts 
showing you bought $100 in lunch.”51 Corporations used repatri-
ated funds as they promised, but this freed up funds that had 
already been set aside for the same purpose.52 This allowed corpora-
tions to increase executive compensation, increase share buybacks, 
and pay large dividends without violating the AJCA guidelines.53 
Adding insult to Congressional injury, U.S. corporations 
actually increased the amount of foreign earnings reinvested per-
manently overseas in both relative and absolute terms in the years 
following the AJCA holiday.54 Furthermore, a study by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research conducted several years after the 
holiday closed concluded that 92 percent of the repatriated funds 
were spent on dividends, share buybacks, or executive bonuses.55 
The bureau’s report stated, “[r]epatriations did not lead to an in-
crease in domestic investment, employment, or R.&D., even for the 
firms that lobbied for the tax holiday stating these intentions.”56 
III. IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED ... 
Although the AJCA failed to meet government expectations, 
and may have even harmed the U.S. economy, the idea of a tax 
                                                                                                            
50 Mundaca, supra note 45. 
51 Lynnley Browning, One-time tax break saved 843 U.S. corporations $265 
billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/24/busi 
ness/worldbusiness/24iht-24tax.13933715.html (internal quotations omitted). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday?: Long-Term Effects 
of the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 1, 16 
(2010); Pinson, supra note 39, at 852. 
55 Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19. A private study published in the 
Journal of Finance demonstrated a statistically significant positive correlation 
between increases in repatriations under the AJCA and “an increase of $.60 to 
$.92 in payouts to shareholders, largely in the form of share repurchases.” 
Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended 
Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. FIN. 753, 782 (2011). 
56 Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19, at 2. 
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holiday has refused to fade.57 Since the AJCA window closed in 
2006, the idea of a tax holiday with different terms has resur-
faced roughly every two to three years.58 Current proposals are 
based on proposals for a tax holiday that began surfacing in 2011, 
gained impetus in 2013, and were introduced in Congress in 2014 
and 2015.59 
A. Current Proposals in Congress 
1. The Invest in Transportation Act 
The Invest in Transportation Act (ITA) is evidence that 
Congress learned the lessons of the AJCA.60 The Act, sponsored 
by Senators Rand Paul and Barbara Boxer, allows corporations 
to repatriate income, but with significant strings attached.61 Par-
ticipating corporations may repatriate overseas income earned 
prior to 2015 at an effective rate of 6.5 percent.62 Corporations 
are required to establish a domestic reinvestment plan requiring 
25 percent of all repatriated income to be invested in the U.S. 
economy via increased hiring, wages, pension contributions, energy 
efficiency, environmental and capital improvements, and research 
and development.63 Tax revenues from repatriated earnings will 
be directed towards infrastructure improvements, specifically high-
ways, bridges, and green energy investments.64 
The Invest in Transportation Act makes four significant 
improvements on the AJCA framework.65 First, corporations will 
                                                                                                            
57 Mundaca, supra note 45. 
58 Id. 
59 ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & APARNA MATHUR, NEW DEMOCRAT NETWORK, THE 
REVENUE AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE PAUL-BOXER PLAN TO ENCOURAGE THE 
REPATRIATION OF FOREIGN-SOURCE EARNINGS BY U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS, NDN 1 (2015). 
60 Invest in Transportation Act, S. 981, 114th Cong. § 2(c) (2015). 
61 Id. § 2(a)–(d). 
62 Id. § 2(b). 
63 Id. § 2(d)(ii). 
64 Id. 
65 Sens. Paul, Boxer Introduce Bipartisan “Invest in Transportation Act,” 
RAND PAUL U.S. SENATOR FOR KENTUCKY (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.paul.sen 
ate.gov/news/sens-paul-boxer-introduce-bipartisan-%E2%80%9Cinvest-trans 
portation-act%E2%80%9D [https://perma.cc/667E-P9HH]. 
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not be permitted to use the repatriated funds for executive com-
pensation.66 Second, the minimum domestic investment require-
ment is 25 percent rather than 15 percent.67 This investment 
requirement is in addition to previously considered funding and 
cannot supplant previously earmarked funds.68 Third, the ITA 
forbids participating companies from inverting at any time in 
the ten taxable-year period following the passage of the ITA.69 
Companies that elect to invert will be taxed at 20 percent, with 
interest, on all repatriated funds.70 Fourth, and most importantly, 
Federal revenues are channeled directly into the Highway Trust 
Fund coffers for investment.71 Companies have up to five years 
to complete their repatriations, but must begin to do so in the 
first year of the holiday window.72 
Senator Boxer, like the various House Representatives 
who championed the AJCA, is optimistic that the ITA will stimulate 
both GDP and job growth.73 Citing various studies done on similar 
repatriation proposals, Senator Boxer’s press release implied that 
the ITA will increase GDP by between $178 and $400 billion and 
provide an increase of between 1.3 and 3.5 million jobs.74 
B. 2016 Presidential Candidates’ Proposals 
Ms. Clinton and Mr. Trump agreed on very few things, but 
both emphasized the need to reform America’s tax system during 
their campaigns.75 Although Mr. Trump was the only candidate to 
                                                                                                            
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation: Hearing on 
the Taxation of the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings, 114th Cong. 7–8 (2015) 
(statement of Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4797 [http:// 
perma.cc/ZB24-PUMY]. 
72 Id. at 8–9. 
73 Boxer-Paul “Invest in Transportation Act,” BARBARA BOXER U.S. SENATOR 
FOR CALIFORNIA (Jan. 29, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150212171417 
/http://www.boxer.senate.gov/press/related/BoxerPaulWhitePaper012915.pdf. 
74 See id. 
75 See ERNST & YOUNG, TRUMP VS. CLINTON: POLICY PERSPECTIVES 2–7 (Aug. 
2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-trump-vs-clinton-policy 
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set forth a concrete written proposal, both acknowledged the 
need to increase investment in the domestic economy while simul-
taneously decreasing corporate offshore cash holdings.76 
1. Ms. Clinton’s Proposals 
Ms. Clinton allegedly talked on several occasions about a 
tax holiday, but did not provide any concrete written proposal.77 
Her official tax plan stated that her administration would pro-
vide companies with “incentives” to repatriate funds.78 Additionally, 
Ms. Clinton proposed $275 billion in infrastructure spending that 
would be funded by “business tax reform.”79 Tax analyst Henrietta 
Treyz believed that this is code for repatriations.80 
Ms. Treyz’s belief was seemingly well supported by re-
marks given by the Clintons.81 Speaking to a CNBC reporter at 
the Clinton Global Initiative Annual Meeting in September 2016, 
Mr. Clinton stated that he supports a repatriation initiative that 
requires investment in a national infrastructure program.82 
WikiLeaks also released the transcripts of several paid speeches 
given by Ms. Clinton in 2013 and 2014 to various corporate groups 
                                                                                                            
-perspectives/%24FILE/ey-trump-vs-clinton-policy-perspectives.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/E3HP-CXER]. 
76 Id. 
77 Jon Schwarz, Hillary Clinton Hints at Giant, Trump-Like Giveaway to 
Corporate America, INTERCEPT (June 27, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016 
/06/27/hillary-clinton-hints-at-giant-trump-like-giveaway-to-corporate-america/ 
[http://perma.cc/YBY9-J6QP]. 
78 The Briefing: Factsheets, HILLARY CLINTON (2016), https://web.archive 
.org/web/20170902125217/https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets
/2015/12/08/ending-inversions-and-investing-in-america [http://perma.cc 
/H9X3-FMLK]. 
79 Lynnley Browning, Trump’s Offshore Tax-Cut Pitch Falls Flat, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 24, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08 
-24/trump-s-offshore-tax-cut-pitch-falls-flat-in-silicon-valley [http://perma.cc 
/BS3P-JPE9]. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Tom DiChristopher, Bill Clinton supports lower corporate tax rate, says 
reasoning for TPP clear, CNBC (Sep. 21, 2016, 8:04 AM), http://www.cnbc.com 
/2016/09/21/bill-clinton-supports-lower-corporate-tax-rate-says-reasoning-for 
-tpp-clear.html [http://perma.cc/8AM7-MFM9]. 
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in which she allegedly intimated that she was interested in a 
“lower rate—a really low rate” for repatriations if participants 
were willing to “invest a percentage in an infrastructure bank.”83 
Although none of this is conclusive evidence of what a 
Clinton administration would have pushed for, it seems reason-
able to believe that Ms. Clinton’s repatriation plan would have 
functioned in a similar fashion to the ITA. 
2. President Trump’s Proposals 
In contrast, President Trump proposed a one-time, no-
strings-attached tax holiday with a 10 percent effective rate.84 
President Trump briefly outlined this proposal in a speech deliv-
ered at the Economic Club of New York in September 2016. 
[W]e will bring back trillions in business wealth parked over-
seas and tax it at a 10 [percent] rate. Some people say there are 
$2 trillion dollars overseas, I think it’s $5 trillion. By taxing it at 
10 [percent] instead of 35 [percent], all of this money will come 
back into our country. We will turn America into a magnet for 
new jobs—and that means jobs in our poorest communities.85 
                                                                                                            
83 Brianna Gurciullo, WikiLeaks: Clinton talked infrastructure in paid 
speeches, POLITICO (Oct. 13, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets 
/morning-transportation/2016/10/wikileaks-clinton-talked-infrastructure-in 
-paid-speeches-216837 [http://perma.cc/Q3EP-AFY3]. 
84 Tax Plan, DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT (2016), https://web.archive 
.org/web/20170208174336/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/tax-plan/? 
/positions/tax-reform [http://perma.cc/4SE2-VCEA]. The language of Mr. Trump’s 
proposal is interesting, as it states that his administration “will provide a 
deemed repatriation of corporate profits held offshore at a one-time tax rate of 
10 percent.” Id. (emphasis added). Analysts have questioned whether only 
repatriated funds will be taxed at this rate or all overseas cash holding will 
be taxed. Yoni Heisler, How Donald Trump’s tax plan might save Apple billions 
of dollars, BGR (Nov. 14, 2016, 5:24 PM), http://bgr.com/2016/11/14/donald 
-trump-tax-plan-apple-overseas-cash-holiday/ [http://perma.cc/F6RC-HNRC]. 
85 Tessa Berenson, Republican Presidential Candidate Donald Trump, 
Address at the Economic Club of New York, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016) (transcript 
available at http://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript/) 
[http://perma.cc/68KD-7583]. In that same speech, Mr. Trump also stated 
“[c]rumbling roads and bridges can become gleaming new infrastructure” and 
promised that his administration “will also allow U.S.-based manufacturers 
to fully expense the cost of new plants and equipment.” Id. 
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Following his election, President Trump made a few addi-
tional statements reiterating this basic outline, but has not elu-
cidated it further.86 Despite the lack of additional facts, industry 
analysts became convinced that repatriated funds would be used 
for infrastructure investment.87 
This conclusion appears to be accurate. During the election 
campaign, Wilbur Ross and Peter Navarro, two of the Trump cam-
paign’s senior policy advisors, published a policy paper outlining 
how repatriation can fund infrastructure investment.88 Under their 
proposal, tax funds received from the 10 percent repatriation tax 
would be spent directly on infrastructure.89 However, corporations 
would also be given the opportunity to further offset their tax 
liability by using the tax credit to invest in infrastructure equity.90 
Participating corporations would therefore be making equity in-
vestments in infrastructure projects rather than paying taxes.91 
The U.S. government would receive no tax revenue under this 
scheme, but Ross and Navarro’s plan would deliver “more and 
new infrastructure.”92 
                                                                                                            
86 Leila Abboud & Brooke Sutherland, Trump and Taxes, BLOOMBERG: 
GADFLY (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:32 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles 
/2016-11-09/trump-corporate-tax-plan-may-deter-inverters-but-not-cash-hoards 
[http://perma.cc/25AU-MGAQ]. 
87 Howard Gleckman, GOP Offering Democrats a Shell Game To Win Their 
Support For A Tax Cut, FORBES: BUS. IN THE BELTWAY (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:34 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2016/11/17/a-tax-on-multinationals 
-cant-pay-for-both-roads-and-tax-cuts/#bde4d3927dc8 [https://perma.cc/JL5Q 
-ZYA6]; Laurence Arnold & Sho Chandra, How Trump Might Try to Fix Bridges 
and Highways: QuickTake Q&A, BLOOMBERG: MKTS. (Nov. 14, 2016, 11:12 
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-14/how-trump-might 
-try-to-fix-bridges-and-highways-quicktake-q-a [http://perma.cc/4SMN-7SBS]. 
88 Wilbur Ross & Peter Navarro, Trump Versus Clinton on Infrastructure, 
PETER NAVARRO (Oct. 27, 2016), http://peternavarro.com/sitebuildercontent 
/sitebuilderfiles/infrastructurereport.pdf [http://perma.cc/TN2W-KKZ9]. Ross 
and Navarro claim that every $200 billion in additional infrastructure ex-
penditures increases the wages of “average Americans” by $88 billion and 
“increases real GDP growth by more than a percentage point.” Id. at 2. They 
further claim that “[e]ach GDP point creates 1.2 million additional jobs.” Id. 
89 Id. at 5. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 5–6. 
92 Id. at 6. Although not explicitly stated in the Ross and Navarro plan, 
the fact that this proposed scheme allegedly functions without bureaucratic 
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C. Industry Proposals 
1. Apple, Inc.’s Proposal 
Although many companies have called for a tax holiday, 
Apple, Inc. has been among the most vocal.93 As America’s 
self-styled “largest corporate tax payer,”94 Apple has repeatedly 
called for a tax holiday on virtually the same terms as the 
AJCA.95 Tim Cook, Apple’s CEO, believes that participating corpo-
rations will use repatriated funds for capital and labor invest-
ments this time because a high percentage of corporate liquidity 
is tied up in offshore cash and the need for domestic investment 
is high.96 Apple, like Pfizer, Proctor & Gamble, and other major 
corporations that have lobbied for another tax holiday, has not 
provided any studies detailing the benefits of such a holiday to 
the American economy.97 
                                                                                                            
oversight is a key theme throughout the paper. Donald Trump’s infrastructure 
page on his campaign website goes to great lengths to point out the various ways 
in which regulatory agencies have delayed or prevented infrastructure projects. 
See Infrastructure, DONALD J. TRUMP (2016) (on file with author). Contra Tribune 
News Services, Trump pushes infrastructure plans but congress blocked Obama 
on issue, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2016, 8:17 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com 
/news/nationworld/politics/ct-donald-trump-infrastructure-spending-20161111 
-story.html [http://perma.cc/Z953-XPCS] (arguing that private-sector-led infra-
structure investment focuses on projects with a guaranteed revenue stream 
and overlooks the impoverished communities that stand to benefit most from 
such investment). 
93 Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 8 (2013). 
94 Id. 
95 Heidi Moore, Tim Cook’s pitch for a corporate tax holiday suits Washing-
ton just fine, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/com 
mentisfree/2013/may/17/tim-cook-tax-holiday-suits-politicians [http://perma 
.cc/TBE2-ZAQN]. 
96 Tim Higgins, Tim Cook’s $181 Billion Headache: Apple’s Cash Abroad, 
BLOOMBERG: TECH. (July 22, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles 
/2015-07-22/tim-cook-s-181-billion-headache-apple-s-cash-held-overseas [http:// 
perma.cc/XJ2R-9BXJ]. 
97 This lack of transparency has led to no small amount of frustration 
among tax reform advocates who see Apple’s calls as an assumption that what is 
good for Apple is good for America. See Moore, supra note 95. 
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2. Standard & Poor’s Proposal 
In October 2016, Standard & Poor Global (S&P) proposed 
that American companies should be allowed to repatriate funds 
at a 0 percent (zero) tax rate if they invest 15 percent of the money 
in certain U.S. infrastructure projects.98 S&P projects that, even 
if companies only brought back half of the $2 trillion held over-
seas, then it would result in a $150 billion investment in infra-
structure, create 307,000 infrastructure-related jobs, and add 
$189.5 billion to the U.S. GDP through the multiplier effect 
within the first several years.99 
The S&P plan has the benefit of being very straightfor-
ward. Participating companies must commit to purchasing—and 
holding—infrastructure bonds issued by the government100 with-
in a certain period of time following repatriation.101 Importantly, 
these infrastructure bonds will pay for “repair[ing] and refur-
bish[ing] the roads, bridges, water systems, and rail networks 
that the American Society of Civil Engineers grades a ‘D+’”.102 
Corporations that fail to purchase the bonds within the time 
period will be forced to pay the full statutory rate plus penal-
ties.103 After purchasing the bonds, participating corporations 
may spend their repatriated funds however they please.104 
                                                                                                            
98 Beth Ann Bovino et al., Rebuilding Through Repatriation: How Corpo-
rate Cash Can Save America’s Infrastructure, S&P GLOBAL (Oct. 5, 2016), https:// 
www.spglobal.com/our-insights/Rebuilding-Through-Repatriation-How-Corporate 
-Cash-Can-Save-Americas-Infrastructure-.html [https://perma.cc/T8D2-A9EP]. 
99 Id. at 2. The multiplier effect is the well-understood economic phenome-
non whereby a given input produces a larger output. See id. at 3 (explaining 
the multiplier effect). A multiplier of 1.5x therefore indicates that every $1 of 
investment will produce a $1.50 return. 
100 S&P suggests state and local levels of government act as the bond issuers. 
Id. at 6. This is unique among the surveyed proposals, all of which contem-
plate infrastructure projects initiated by federal agencies. 
101 Id. at 6. 
102 Id. at 2. This is especially important when calculating the multiplier ef-
fect, as multipliers tend to be higher in struggling economies. See id. Focusing on 
projects in areas that struggle the most will therefore produce the highest 
returns. See generally 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y 
CIV. ENGINEERS (2013), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ [https://perma 
.cc/7KYG-GA89] (explaining the ASCE infrastructure grading system). 
103 Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 6–7. 
104 Id. at 7. 
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S&P offers several well-reasoned arguments in support of 
their proposal.105 First, S&P believes that corporations will be 
enthusiastic to participate in this repatriation holiday.106 Although 
corporate overseas cash holdings have continually increased, the 
debt of the top fifteen U.S. corporations has grown even more 
quickly.107 S&P suggests this means that many corporations have 
exhausted their domestic cash flows and are instead financing 
stock repurchases and dividends using debt.108 S&P believes 
that corporations prefer repatriation and domestic investment to 
debt and overseas cash and will therefore participate.109 Another 
inspiring factor is the increasing willingness of supranational 
tax authorities, such as the European Union Tax Commission, to 
pursue these funds.110 Most importantly, corporations will be 
making an investment rather than simply paying taxes.111 This 
will induce corporations to participate and, in S&P’s words, 
“save America’s infrastructure.”112 
IV. A NEWER DEAL: PROJECTED POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES 
The AJCA’s failure to stimulate anything beyond share-
holder buybacks means that proposals for another tax holiday 
deserve strict scrutiny.113 Statistics may be a class of damned 
lies, but any proposal that promises economic growth should be 
judged primarily using a cost/benefit analysis.114 If a directed 
                                                                                                            
105 Id. at 7–9. 
106 See id. at 5, 9. 
107 Id. at 5. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. See also David Kocieniewski & Lynnley Browning, Apple’s $14.5 
Billion EU Bill May Press U.S. on Tax Overhaul, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 30, 2016, 
4:57 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-30/apple-s-14-5-bil 
lion-eu-bill-may-pressure-u-s-on-tax-overhaul [https://perma.cc/2WED-K3XT] 
(discussing U.S. multinationals whose taxes are currently being investigated 
by the E.U.); Juliette Garside, War of words hots up between US and EU over 
tax avoidance, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2016, 1:36 PM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/business/2016/aug/25/war-of-words-eu-us-tax-avoidance-starbucks-apple 
-amazon [https://perma.cc/CL8P-287L] (presaging more active E.U. tax inves-
tigations into U.S. multinationals). 
111 Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 6. 
112 Id. at 9. 
113 See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 6. 
114 See id. at 5. 
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tax holiday will produce greater net economic benefits than per-
petuating the status quo, then Congress should pursue such a 
holiday.115 In this section, I set out the framework for determin-
ing the costs and benefits of each proposal and compare the 
cost/benefit differential for each proposal. 
A. The Cost of a Tax Holiday 
Although each proposal involves differing sums and effec-
tive rates, the theoretical cost analysis for each proposal is iden-
tical.116 Under each proposal, a certain sum will be repatriated.117 
Every company that would participate in a repatriation tax holiday 
could hypothetically repatriate that same sum at the statutory 
rate.118 The difference between these is the basic cost of the plan 
to the Federal government.119 This basic cost figure is then modified 
using the Government Purchases Multiplier (GPM) to determine 
the cost of each proposal to the U.S. economy.120 
For the purposes of this Note, I assume two things. First, 
I assume that the Federal government would allocate the repatri-
ation revenue (from corporations paying the statutory 35 percent 
rate) evenly across government rather than concentrating it in a 
single agency or department. Second, I assume that all revenue 
will be spent on government purchases rather than on interest 
payments or transfers. These assumptions enable the use of the 
general multiplier for Federal purchases of goods and services.121 
                                                                                                            
115 See id. 
116 See id. at 1–2. 
117 Denoted in the following equations as “Amount Repatriated.” 
118 Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Do-
mestic Effective Rate). Domestic Effective Rate = (Domestic Statutory Rate – 
Overseas Effective Rate). Note that this equation takes the fact that corporations 
pay a certain percentage of their tax overseas into account. See MARPLES & 
GRAVELLE, supra note 11, at 1–2. 
119 Basic Cost = (Government Revenue at Statutory Rate) – (Government 
Revenue at Tax Holiday Rate). 
120 Cost to U.S. Economy = (Basic Cost) x (Government Purchases Multiplier). 
121 The Government Purchases Multiplier (GPM) is one of several different 
government spending multipliers that model the results of different types of 
government spending. The GPM excludes interest payments and transfers 
and examines government-wide spending. See generally Giancarlo Corsetti et 
al., What Determines Government Spending Multipliers? (IMF Working Paper 
(WP/12/150) (2012)), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12150.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NL3M-9QPP]. 
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Although the exact multiplier is debated—estimates range be-
tween 0.5x and 1.0x122—existing empirical studies support 0.9x 
as an acceptably accurate figure for middle-of-the-road economic 
situations such as that which currently exists.123 
1. The ITA Proposal124 
The New Democratic Network (NDN) estimates that U.S. 
corporations would repatriate about $1.4 trillion under the 
terms proposed by the ITA.125 If corporations pay an average 10 
percent effective rate on their overseas earnings, that $1.4 trillion 
would add $350 billion to Federal coffers if repatriated under 
current tax rules.126 When modified by the GPM, that $350 bil-
lion would produce a $315 billion benefit to the U.S. economy.127 
If corporations repatriate that same $1.4 trillion at a 6.5 percent 
effective rate to foreign governments under the ITA, then Uncle 
Sam nets a mere $91 billion in taxes.128 If this revenue was simply 
spent on government purchases, then it would produce a benefit 
to the U.S. economy of $81.9 billion.129 Thus, the ITA plan to 
                                                                                                            
122 See Robert E. Hall, By How Much Does GDP Rise If the Government 
Buys More Output?, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: FALL 2009 183, 
195 (David H. Romer & Justin Wolfers eds., 2009) (reviewing the empirical 
studies on the effects of government defense purchases). Hall also raises the 
interesting proposition that the GDP multiplier may go as high as 1.7x “when 
monetary policy becomes passive with a zero nominal interest rate.” Id. at 
187. See generally Corsetti et al., supra note 121. 
123 Hall, supra note 122, at 195; Robert J. Barro & Charles J. Redlick, Macro-
economic Effects From Government Purchases and Taxes, 126 Q.J. ECON. 51, 
72 (2011); Giovanni Ganelli & Juha Tervala, The Welfare Multiplier of Public 
Infrastructure Investment (IMF Working Paper (WP/16/40) (2015)); Valerie A. 
Ramey, Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?, 49 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 673, 675 (2011). 
124 The analysis for the ITA proposal can be extended to the Clinton pro-
posal given the similarities between the two. See supra Section III.B.1. 
125 SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 59, at 36. 
126 Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x 
(Domestic Effective Rate) = ($1.4 trillion) x (0.35 – 0.10) = $350 billion. 
127 Benefit to U.S. Economy = (Government Revenue at Statutory Rate) x 
(Government Purchases Multiplier) = ($350 billion) x (0.9) = $315 billion. 
128 Government Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holi-
day Rate) = ($1.4 trillion) x (0.065) = $91 billion. 
129 Benefit to U.S. Economy = (Government Revenue at Holiday Rate) x 
(GPM) = ($91 billion) x (0.9) = $81.9 billion. 
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repatriate funds at a reduced rate and invest them must add at 
least $233.1 billion worth of but-for growth to the U.S. economy 
to justify a tax holiday.130 
2. S&P Global 
This calculation is somewhat easier for the Standard & 
Poor proposal. S&P is less optimistic than the NDN on the 
amount that will be repatriated and estimates that only about 
$1 trillion of all overseas funds would be repatriated during a 
tax-free (0 percent effective rate) holiday.131 Assuming this fig-
ure is correct, and corporations already pay a 10 percent rate to 
foreign governments, then the Federal government would be 
giving up $250 billion of revenue.132 When modified by the GPM, 
the net cost to the U.S. economy is $233.1 billion and the S&P 
plan must better that figure to produce a net benefit.133 
3. President Trump’s Proposal 
President Trump’s repatriation proposal is the most sim-
plistic. He has stated that there is somewhere between $2 and 
$5 trillion stashed overseas and that a 10 percent rate will in-
duce corporations to bring their entire overseas cash home.134 
President Trump’s upper-bound estimate of $5 trillion is wildly 
out of line with industry analyses,135 so I will use $2 trillion as 
                                                                                                            
130 Break-Even Amount = (Benefit to U.S. Economy at Statutory Rate) – 
(Benefit to U.S. Economy at Holiday Rate) = ($315 billion) – ($81.9 billion) = 
$233.1 billion. Note that this is but-for growth; the total amount that the ITA 
plan would need to generate to produce a net benefit to the U.S. economy 
remains $315 billion. 
131 See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 2. 
132 Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x 
(Domestic Effective Rate) = ($1 trillion) x (0.35 – 0.10) = $250 billion. Gov-
ernment Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holiday Rate) = 
($1 trillion) x (0.0) = $0. 
133 Benefit to U.S. Economy at Statutory Rate = (Government Revenue at 
Statutory Rate) x (GPM) = ($250 billion) x (0.9) = $233.1 billion. 
134 Tax Plan, supra note 84. 
135 Compare Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 3 (stating that U.S. corpora-
tions hold more than $2 trillion overseas), and CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, 
supra note 4, at 2 (stating that U.S. corporations hold about $2.4 trillion 
overseas), with Berenson, supra note 85. 
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the total sum to be repatriated. $2 trillion repatriated at the 
statutory rate generates $500 billion in revenue for the Treasury 
and $450 billion of economic benefit to the United States.136 A 
10 percent holiday rate would reduce the Treasury’s revenue to 
$200 billion and,137 if the Federal government spent the revenue 
on purchases, produce an economic benefit of $180 billion.138 
President Trump’s plan must therefore generate a massive $270 
billion worth of but-for growth to simply break even.139 
4. Summary 
The basic revenues and benefits of the plans are summa-
rized below in Figure 1. 
Plan 
Amount 
Repatriated 
Holiday 
Rate 
Revenue 
at 
Statutory 
Rate 
Revenue 
at Holiday 
Rate 
Benefit to 
U.S. 
Economy at 
Statutory 
Rate 
ITA $1.4 trillion 6.5% $350 billion $91 billion $315 billion 
S&P $1 trillion 0% (15%) $250 billion $0 $233.1 billion 
Trump $2 trillion 10% $500 billion $200 billion $450 billion 
 
Figure 1: Basic Revenues and Benefits 
                                                                                                            
136 Government Revenue at Statutory Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x 
(Domestic Effective Rate) = ($2 trillion) x (0.35 – 0.10) = $500 billion. Benefit 
to U.S. Economy = (Government Revenue at Statutory Rate) x (GPM) = ($500 
billion) x (0.90) = $450 billion. 
137 Government Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holiday 
Rate) = ($2 trillion) x (0.10) = $200 billion. 
138 Government Revenue at Holiday Rate = (Amount Repatriated) x (Holiday 
Rate) = ($2 trillion) x (0.10) = $200 billion. 
139 Break-Even Amount = (Benefit to U.S. Economy at Statutory Rate) – (Bene-
fit to U.S. Economy at Holiday Rate) = ($450 billion – $180 billion) = $270 
billion. Once again, the purpose of this figure is to illustrate how much more 
lucrative infrastructure investment must be to justify a tax holiday. 
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B. The Benefits of Infrastructure Investment 
Calculating the benefits of each plan is somewhat more 
difficult because the benefits of infrastructure investment fluc-
tuate significantly based on existing economic conditions.140 
1. Precedent: The New Deal and Interstate Creation Act 
America has a long, well-documented history of success-
fully reinvigorating the domestic economy via infrastructure 
investment.141 In 1933, at the height of the Great Depression, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced a New Deal for 
Americans.142 As part of this New Deal, the Federal government 
invested huge sums into public works projects such as highways, 
bridges, and dams.143 Notably, many of these projects are still 
providing significant benefits to the U.S. economy.144 Massive 
investment in highways under the Eisenhower Administration 
further boosted the U.S. economy and provided a framework around 
which the U.S. enjoyed an unprecedented period of growth and 
prosperity.145 Notably, the benefits of transportation infrastruc-
ture investment are not limited to new projects and may even be 
greater when investment is directed towards “plain old mainte-
nance” and upgrading existing infrastructure such as highways.146 
                                                                                                            
140 See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 3–4. 
141 For a technical analysis of the economic benefits associated with public 
infrastructure expenditure in 20th century America, see David Alan Aschauer, 
Is Public Expenditure Productive?, 23 J. MONETARY ECON. 177 (1989). See gener-
ally Adam J. White, Infrastructure Policy: Lessons from American History, 35 
NEW ATLANTIS 3 (2012) (reciting America’s lucrative history of large-scale 
investment in infrastructure). 
142 White, supra note 141, at 3. 
143 Id. at 3, 24. 
144 THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT (Oct. 11, 2010), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/infrastructure 
_investment_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/39UD-JJJP]. 
145 Edward M. Gramlich, Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay, 32 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1176, 1178 (1993). 
146 Id. at 1184. Gramlich demonstrates a historic 35 percent lifetime re-
turn on investment from projects maintaining existing highway conditions 
from 1948–90. Id. 
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2. Think Tank Thoughts: EPI and IRENA 
Infrastructure as stimulus is just as valid today as it was 
in the 1930s and 1950s.147 A 2014 study of different infrastruc-
ture investment proposals conducted by Washington-based think 
tank Economic Policy Institute (EPI) estimated an average 1.6x 
multiplier based on data from the Congressional Budget Office, 
Council of Economic Advisors, and Moody’s Analytics.148 The 
study examined infrastructure spending on green building tech-
nologies and utilities149 in addition to highways and bridges, 
transportation systems and water systems.150 
Investment in green technology such as renewable energy 
plants and “green cities” is a new, but reliable, form of economic 
stimulus.151 A 2016 report from the International Renewable 
Energy Agency, an Abu Dhabi–based think tank, found that 
doubling investment in renewables in the United States would 
result in a $110–150 billion GDP boost152 and create more than 
a million permanent new jobs over the next decade.153 
                                                                                                            
147 Josh Bivens, The Short- and Long-Term Impact of Infrastructure In-
vestments on Employment and Economic Activity in the U.S. Economy 47 (2014) 
(Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper 347), http://www.epi.org/files/2014/impact-of 
-infrastructure-investments.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5NB-JNMV]. 
148 Id. at 21. 
149 Id. at 13–14. EPI found that green technologies were a particularly good 
investment, yielding a multiplier of between 2.8x and 6.0x based on the eco-
nomic conditions of the areas of the projects. See generally S. Pacala & R. 
Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 
Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968–72 (2004). 
150 Bivens, supra note 147, at 15–17. 
151 Rabia Ferroukhi et al., Renewable Energy Benefits: Measuring the Eco-
nomics, IRENA 27–28 (2016), http://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency 
/Publication/2016/IRENA_Measuring-the-Economics_2016.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/PLZ8-6PVS]. 
152 Id. at 25. In 2015 the U.S. public and private sectors invested a $44 bil-
lion into renewable energy projects. Rebecca Harrington, The US is actually 
leading the way on clean energy, BUS. INSIDER (May 6, 2016, 12:06 PM), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/us-2015-renewable-energy-investments-2016-5 [https:// 
perma.cc/5LGW-ETWV]. 
153 Ferroukhi et al., supra note 151, at 41. 
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3. Industry Analysis: S&P Global & Moody’s Analytics 
Standard & Poor projects that a $150 billion investment 
in infrastructure will create 307,000 infrastructure-related jobs 
and add $189.5 billion to the U.S. GDP through the multiplier 
effect within the first several years.154 S&P estimates that this 
multiplier would average around 1.3x, but could be as high as 
1.7x in the correct conditions.155 
Moody’s Analytics is somewhat more optimistic than S&P 
and estimates a 1.78x multiplier for stable periods of time in the 
business cycle.156 
4. Summary and Application 
This evidence demonstrates that we may safely assume a 
multiplier somewhere in the 1.3x to 1.8x range given that rela-
tive stability of the U.S. economy at the present.157 In Figure 2, 
below, I present each proposal and its potential benefits under 
each multiplier from the range, rounded to the nearest tenth. The 
                                                                                                            
154 Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 4. 
155 Id. at 3–4. The reason for this variation is differing economic conditions; a 
strong economy will produce a lower multiplier while a stagnant or struggling 
economy will produce a greater multiplier. Id. The upper-bound estimate is 
interesting because it is equal to Robert Hall’s calculation for the federal 
purchases multiplier in economies with a zero nominal interest rate. See 
Hall, supra note 122, at 187. This raises the argument that it does not matter 
whether the federal government purchases goods and services or invests in 
infrastructure because the benefit to the domestic economy will essentially be 
the same. While this argument may have some merit, Hall’s calculation is based 
on a ten-year model and it seems highly unlikely that the Federal Reserve 
will allow rates to remain around zero for that long. See David Harrison, Fed 
Minutes Show Officials Expect to Raise Rates ‘Relatively Soon,’ WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-minutes-show-officials-expect 
-to-raise-rates-relatively-soon-1476295562. 
156 Dan White & Sarah Crane, U.S. Infrastructure Funding Needs More 
Than a Quick Fix, MOODY’S ANALYTICS (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.economy 
.com/dismal/analysis/free/254109 [https://perma.cc/X7HW-9UWX]. 
157 See, e.g., Kimberly Amadeo, US Economic Outlook: For 2018 and Beyond, 
BALANCE (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/us-economic-outlook-330 
5669 [https://perma.cc/P8DR-WV56]. 
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benefit to the U.S. economy at statutory rate figure generated in 
the preceding section on cost is presented as the “Break-Even” 
figure here for comparison purposes.158 
 
Figure 2: Benefits of Infrastructure Investment 
There are several notable takeaways from this chart. First, 
only the S&P plan produces a net economic benefit. Second, the 
ITA and President Trump proposals not only fail to break even, 
but produce substantial losses even at the highest multiplier.159 
These results look like damning evidence that a directed tax holi-
day will likely be a bad deal for the American economy. If this is 
the case, then why is a tax holiday is even being contemplated? 
V. BALANCING UTILITIES 
At this point, it is appropriate to review the arguments 
against a tax holiday and consider several rebuttals. 
A. Arguments Against a Directed Tax Holiday 
The argument against a tax holiday is comprised of three 
basic ideas: tax holidays only benefit corporations, tax holidays 
encourage bad behavior, and tax holidays are unnecessary. 
                                                                                                            
158 See supra Section IV.A.4. 
159 See supra Figure 2. 
 Break-
Even 
Infrastructure Multiplier 
 1.3x 1.4x 1.5x 1.6x 1.7x 1.8x 
ITA 
$315 
billion 
$118.3 
billion 
$127.4 
billion 
$136.5 
billion 
$145.6 
billion 
$154.7 
billion 
$163.8 
billion 
S&P 
$233.1 
billion 
$195 
billion 
$210 
billion 
$225 
billion 
$240 
billion 
$255 
billion 
$270 
billion 
Trump 
$450 
billion 
$260 
billion 
$280 
billion 
$300 
billion 
$320 
billion 
$340 
billion 
$360 
billion 
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1. Tax Holidays Only Benefit Corporations 
The most common argument against tax holidays is that 
they only benefit corporations.160 Looking to the AJCA, opponents 
of tax holidays argue that another tax holiday will produce the 
same results.161 The Federal government will lose revenue,162 
corporations will issue large dividends to shareholders,163 and 
the promised new jobs will not be created.164 Corporate America 
will benefit while the rest of the country is worse off.165 
This argument is also extended to proposed directed tax 
holidays such as the ITA. Critics perform a cost-benefit analysis, 
reach results similar to those presented in Figure 2, and con-
clude that the U.S. economy will lose money on a tax holiday.166 
2. Tax Holidays Encourage Bad Behavior 
There is also some evidence to suggest that tax holidays 
condition U.S. corporations to avoid paying domestic taxes by 
keeping money overseas.167 After the 2004 tax holiday, U.S. cor-
porations increased the percentage of foreign earnings held 
overseas.168 This suggests that another tax holiday will only 
encourage U.S. corporations to keep even more foreign earnings 
overseas in anticipation of a third tax holiday—a classic case of 
corporate Pavlovian conditioning.169 
                                                                                                            
160 See, e.g., Kristina Peterson, Report: Repatriation Tax Holiday a ‘Failed’ 
Policy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2011, 9:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 
10001424052970203633104576623771022129888. 
161 CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 4. 
162 Id. 
163 See, e.g., Robin Wigglesworth, Where will corporate America’s overseas 
cash pile go?, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/ee554c60 
-b6ed-11e6-961e-a1acd97f622d. 
164 See Mundaca, supra note 45. 
165 See Schwartz & Duhigg, supra note 19. 
166 See Richard Rubin, Repatriation Tax Break from Paul Boxer Would Cost 
$118 Billion, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 30, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/articles/2015-04-30/repatriation-tax-break-from-paul-boxer-would 
-cost-118-billion [https://perma.cc/9FZ5-LRBL]. 
167 Brennan, supra note 54, at 4. 
168 Id. at 7–8. 
169 Id. at 16–17. 
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A corollary to this is the morality argument that another tax 
holiday is wrong because it is simply pandering to corporations.170 
3. Tax Holidays Are Unnecessary 
The argument that tax holidays are unnecessary is a re-
sponse to CEOs’ claims that their companies’ domestic operations 
are suffering from a lack of capital because their cash is trapped 
overseas.171 The cash is not “trapped” overseas by any sinister 
government machinations; rather, U.S. corporations are leaving 
their overseas cash in the hands of their foreign subsidiaries 
because boards of directors are making a business decision not 
to repatriate the funds.172 The United States therefore does not 
need to take legislative action because boards of directors will 
decide to repatriate overseas earnings when repatriation becomes 
a prudent business decision.173 The argument that a tax holiday 
is unnecessary is further supported by the shifting international 
tax environment; which may soon force U.S multinationals to 
repatriate their funds at the statutory rate.174 The recent E.U. 
ruling that Apple Inc.’s tax arrangement with Ireland is illegal 
sent shock waves through the international tax community and 
inspired predictions that preferential tax situations around the 
world will be scrutinized closely in the coming months.175 
                                                                                                            
170 Chris Sanchirico, A Repatriation Tax Holiday for US Multinationals? 
Four Contagious Illusions, TAX POL’Y CTR.: TAXVOX (Dec. 10, 2014), http:// 
www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/repatriation-tax-holiday-us-multinationals-four 
-contagious-illusions [https://perma.cc/VU3Z-UZB2]. How pandering is any dif-
ferent from Congress’s normal activities is an entirely different issue. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 The Global Tax Environment in 2016 and Implications for Internation-
al Tax Reform: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means U.S. House of 
Representatives, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (testimony of Edward Kleinbard, for-
mer Chief of Staff of the Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation). 
175 Simon Bowers, Europe, Apple, and the money burning a hole in Silicon 
Valley’s wallet, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/business/2016/sep/03/ireland-apple-silicon-valley-money-burning-hole-wal 
let [https://perma.cc/W4HB-395D]. 
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B. Realities that Support a Directed Tax Holiday 
Careful consideration of the various proposals for a tax 
holiday and the arguments against them leads to the conclusion 
that there is no perfect tax holiday solution. There may not even 
be an ideal solution. Critics of tax holidays make well-reasoned 
arguments and have valid concerns. However, there are several 
realities that support a directed tax holiday with revenues invested 
directly into infrastructure. 
1. Any Benefit from a Tax Holiday Is a Windfall Benefit 
First and foremost, it is essential to recognize that any 
benefit from a tax holiday is a windfall benefit.176 Corporations 
have trillions of dollars overseas because they have refused to 
repatriate those funds under the current statutory rate.177 Thus, 
any benefit added to the U.S. economy because of a tax holiday 
is but-for growth!178 The Federal government cannot lose reve-
nue because it has realized no tax revenue from overseas corporate 
cash.179 This reality is reflected in the fact that the Joint Committee 
on Taxation, Congress’s budget scorekeepers, analyzes revenue 
produced by a repatriation tax holiday as new revenue.180 
Understanding and accepting this reality completely changes 
the supposedly damning results presented in Figure 2. Repro-
duced below is Figure 3 showing the results of Figure 2, with a 
modification to the break-even figure that reflects the economic 
reality of repatriated funds. 
                                                                                                            
176 Presentation of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation: Public 
Hearing on Present Law and Selected Proposals Related to the Repatriation of 
Foreign Earnings Before the Select Revenue Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 114th Cong. 15–18 (2015) [hereinafter Hearing on Repatriation of 
Foreign Earnings]. 
177 Apple, Inc. CEO Tim Cook has been very candid about the fact that 
Apple will not repatriate any meaningful sum of money until there are mean-
ingful corporate tax reforms. Jena McGregor, Tim Cook, the interview: Running 
Apple “is sort of a lonely job,” WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/sf/business/2016/08/13/tim-cook-the-interview-running-apple 
-is-sort-of-a-lonely-job/?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/M8RH-RVXE]. 
178 Hearing on Repatriation of Foreign Earnings, supra note 176, at 15–18. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
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Figure 3: Tax Holiday Benefits as Windfall Benefits 
Thus, a directed tax holiday that funnels money directly 
into infrastructure investments is not just a good deal for the 
U.S. economy, it is practically impossible to turn down. 
2. America Wants Infrastructure Investment 
The American voting public made it clear in 2016 that do-
mestic job growth and infrastructure development are major con-
cerns.181 A directed tax holiday that channels revenues directly 
into building infrastructure and repairing old infrastructure will 
create new jobs and better cities.182 There is also an intangible 
morale boost that comes from new infrastructure, particularly green 
infrastructure.183 New projects create a sense of hope and opti-
mism184—feelings that are especially needed in the decaying urban 
areas that would benefit most from these infrastructure projects. 
3. The Timing Is Right 
The international tax environment at present is hostile to 
U.S. corporations, suggesting that a tax holiday will likely be 
                                                                                                            
181 Ben Casselman, Stop Saying Trump’s Win Had Nothing To Do With 
Economics, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 9, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com 
/features/stop-saying-trumps-win-had-nothing-to-do-with-economics/ [https:// 
perma.cc/N9BV-PNLB]. 
182 See Bovino et al., supra note 98. 
183 See Ferroukhi et al., supra note 151, at 31–37. 
184 Id. at 36–37. 
 Break-
Even 
Infrastructure Multiplier 
 1.3x 1.4x 1.5x 1.6x 1.7x 1.8x 
ITA $0 
$118.3 
billion 
$127.4 
billion 
$136.5 
billion 
$145.6 
billion 
$154.7 
billion 
$163.8 
billion 
S&P $0 
$195 
billion 
$210 
billion 
$225 
billion 
$240 
billion 
$255 
billion 
$270 
billion 
Trump $0 
$260 
billion 
$280 
billion 
$300 
billion 
$320 
billion 
$340 
billion 
$360 
billion 
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well-received.185 The recent E.U. court ruling that Ireland had 
unfairly shielded Apple from paying corporate taxes has made 
U.S. multinationals uncomfortable leaving large sums of money 
overseas.186 Thus, a tax holiday would likely be better subscribed 
to than the AJCA was.187 Furthermore, U.S. corporations are cur-
rently trapped in a moribund domestic economy and are under 
increasing pressure from shareholders to reinvest in their under-
lying business, and in research and development.188 These fac-
tors suggest that the timing is right for a tax holiday. 
4. The Moral High Ground Is Relatively Low 
The moral concerns of pandering to corporations pale in 
comparison to the tangible economic good that can be done with 
billions of dollars in infrastructure investment.189 Yes, corpora-
tions should just pay their taxes like everyone else does. But 
U.S. multinationals will continue to leave their money overseas 
in increasingly well-hidden places because the statutory rate is, 
in the words of Tim Cook, “absolutely crazy.”190 Standing firm on 
the statutory rate may eventually result in corporations caving 
in and bringing their money back to the United States, but this 
result could take years to achieve and America’s infrastructure 
needs are urgent.191 It seems better to be realistic about what 
the moral high ground will actually buy—and the answer is not 
new roads, green energy, or urban regeneration. 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. corporate tax law is long overdue for a reform—there 
is very little genuine debate on this point. However, comprehensive 
                                                                                                            
185 See Bowers, supra 175. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Eric Platt, US Companies’ cash pile hits $1.7tn, FIN. TIMES (May 20, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/368ef430-1e24-11e6-a7bc-ee846770ec15.  
189 See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 2. 
190 Dylan Tweney, Tim Cook says U.S. tax code is ‘absolutely crazy,’ VENTURE 
BEAT (May 28, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/05/28/tim-cook-says 
-u-s-tax-code-is-absolutely-crazy/ [https://perma.cc/VA46-J9UW]. 
191 See Bovino et al., supra note 98, at 2. 
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reform of any variety takes time and bipartisan cooperation—
qualities that are in short supply in Washington. A tax holiday 
is not a lasting solution and there are significant dangers to 
repeating a plan that was only ever meant to be a one-time oc-
currence. There is a real possibility that American multinationals 
will develop Pavlovian tendencies and simply stash even more 
cash overseas in hope of another holiday in the future. Compre-
hensive reform is the only way to fully resolve these concerns. 
Nevertheless, the evidence seems to suggest that a directed 
tax holiday is a good idea. Economic practicalities suggest that a 
directed tax holiday would significantly benefit the U.S. economy. 
The current international tax hostility towards American multi-
nationals suggests that U.S. corporations may be looking for a 
new place to park their cash. U.S. corporate debts and domestic 
stagnation suggest that the United States is a prime candidate 
for investment. History suggests that real, lasting economic 
growth follows infrastructure investment and the American 
people recently elected a President who promised to “Make 
America Great Again.”192 A directed tax holiday channeled into 
infrastructure investment is a relatively simple way to do that. 
 
                                                                                                            
192 President Donald J. Trump, The Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017). 
